Families as Roommates: Changes in U.S. Household Size from 1850 to 2000 by Alejandrina Salcedo et al.
Banco de M¶ exico
Documentos de Investigaci¶ on
Banco de M¶ exico
Working Papers
N± 2010-07
Families as Roommates: Changes in U.S. Household
Size from 1850 to 2000
Alejandrina Salcedo Todd Schoellman
Banco de M¶ exico Clemson University
Michµ ele Tertilt
Stanford University, NBER and CEPR
June 2010
La serie de Documentos de Investigaci¶ on del Banco de M¶ exico divulga resultados preliminares de
trabajos de investigaci¶ on econ¶ omica realizados en el Banco de M¶ exico con la ¯nalidad de propiciar
el intercambio y debate de ideas. El contenido de los Documentos de Investigaci¶ on, as¶ ³ como las
conclusiones que de ellos se derivan, son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no re°ejan
necesariamente las del Banco de M¶ exico.
The Working Papers series of Banco de M¶ exico disseminates preliminary results of economic
research conducted at Banco de M¶ exico in order to promote the exchange and debate of ideas. The
views and conclusions presented in the Working Papers are exclusively of the authors and do not
necessarily re°ect those of Banco de M¶ exico.Documento de Investigaci¶ on Working Paper
2010-07 2010-07
Families as Roommates: Changes in U.S. Household
Size from 1850 to 2000*
Alejandrina Salcedoy Todd Schoellmanz
Banco de M¶ exico Clemson University
Michµ ele Tertiltx
Stanford University, NBER and CEPR
Abstract: The size of the average American household has fallen dramatically -from
six in 1850 to three in 2000. To explain this decline we model households as collections of
roommates who share the costs of household public goods. If private goods are more income
elastic than public goods, as we document in the paper, an increase in income endogenously
leads to smaller households. We calibrate the model to match data from 2000. Changing
incomes to their 1850 levels, we ¯nd that our mechanism can explain 37 percent of the
observed reduction in the number of adults per household and 16 percent of the reduction
in the number of children.
Keywords: Household size, living arrangements, roommates, economies of scale, household
public goods, fertility decline.
JEL Classi¯cation: D10, E10, J11, N30, O10.
Resumen: El tama~ no del hogar estadounidense promedio ha ca¶ ³do dram¶ aticamente -de
seis personas en 1850 a tres en 2000. Para explicar esta ca¶ ³da proponemos un modelo en
el que vivir con otras personas es bene¯cioso ¶ unicamente porque los costos de los bienes
p¶ ublicos del hogar se pueden compartir. Si la elasticidad ingreso de los bienes privados es
mayor que la de los p¶ ublicos, como se documenta en este estudio, un aumento en el ingreso
reducir¶ a, end¶ ogenamente, el tama~ no del hogar. Calibramos el modelo usando datos del a~ no
2000. Cambiando el ingreso a su nivel de 1850 encontramos que nuestro mecanismo puede
explicar 37 por ciento de la ca¶ ³da en el n¶ umero de adultos por hogar y 16 por ciento de la
ca¶ ³da en el n¶ umero de ni~ nos.
Palabras Clave: Tama~ no del hogar, arreglo familiar, econom¶ ³as de escala, bienes p¶ ublicos
del hogar, ca¶ ³da en la fertilidad.
*We owe a large debt of gratitude to Luigi Pistaferri, who participated in the early stages of this project
and contributed greatly to our understanding of the data. We would also like to thank Stefania Albanesi, Ran
Abramitzky, Alessandra Fogli, Jeremy Greenwood, Bob Hall, Larry E. Jones, Narayana Kocherlakota, Pete
Klenow and seminar participants at the Minneapolis Fed, SED 2005, the Macro SITE 2005, the 2008 Midwest
Macro Conference, Brown University, Columbia University, and the Hoover Lunch for helpful comments. We
are particularly grateful to Tom Mroz for sharing his computational resources at Clemson University. Funds
from NSF grant No. 0748889 and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) are gratefully
acknowledged.
y Direcci¶ on General de Investigaci¶ on Econ¶ omica. Email: asalcedo@banxico.org.mx.
z Clemson University. Email: todd.schoellman@gmail.com.
x Stanford University, NBER and CEPR. Email: tertilt@standford.edu.1 Introduction
Over the last century and a half, family structure and living arrangements in the United States have
undergone signiﬁcant changes. Today’s average household is 50 percent smaller than in 1850. The
decline in fertility explains part of this change, as the average household today contains two fewer
children of the head. However, virtually all other forms of cohabitation have become less common
as well. The average household has fewer parents, fewer siblings, fewer grandchildren, and fewer
other relatives of the household head. While in 1850 almost every household included a married
couple, today less than half of all households do. Even the number of non-relatives has declined
by about one person per household.
One way to understand changing living arrangements is to model each form of cohabitation
separately, focusing on the speciﬁc tradeoffs and institutions most relevant to that form. In this pa-
per, weexploreanalternativeview. Giventhatallformsofcohabitationhavebecomelesscommon,
we propose a model that explicitly abstracts from speciﬁc forms of cohabitation or institutions and
focuses on the economic tradeoffs common to all forms of living together. In our model the decline
in cohabitation is an optimal response to growing incomes. When we calibrate the model, we ﬁnd
that about a third of the decline in household size since 1850 can be attributed to rising incomes
alone. Thus, our analysis suggests that a substantial part of the decline in living together may be
understood as a common response to growing incomes. On the other hand we explain only a part
of the total decline, leaving room for alternative mechanisms or for models with a richer focus on
one particular form of cohabitation.
In this paper, we think of households as collections of roommates living together to share
the costs of household public goods. The larger a household, the less each roommate pays for
public goods such as housing. The mechanism we propose is based on the idea that private goods
have a higher income elasticity than public goods. Therefore, as people get richer, the household
public goods become relatively less important. This changing consumption pattern reduces the
economies of scale of living with other people, and endogenously decreases the optimal household
size. Hence, optimally changing consumption bundles provide the link from income to household
size. In other words, the optimal number of roommates is decided through a simple cost-beneﬁt
analysis, with costs and beneﬁts changing endogenously as income changes.
While literal roommates constitute only a small fraction of all households, we believe that de-
cisions to form, alter, or dissolve families are also inﬂuenced by the same cost and beneﬁt analysis.
For example, adult children have the choice of whether or not to leave their parents’ home. For
those who stay, a driving consideration is cost. Elderly parents often move in with their adult
children to save money. Similarly, when couples contemplate a divorce, they consider whether es-
1tablishingtwoseparatehouseholdsisaffordable.1 Ontheotherhand, therearealsohappilymarried
couples who choose to live apart because they can afford to do so. Sociological and demographic
research has studied the rise of Living Apart Together (LAT) Relationships – couples who iden-
tify their relationships as stable but choose not to live together (Sasha Roseneil 2006, Charles Q.
Strohm, Judith A. Seltzer, Susan D. Cochran & Vickie M. Mays 2009).
Our story implies that richer households are smaller and spend a lower fraction of their budget
on public goods relative to private goods. We provide evidence that these two implications are
indeed observed in the data. Using U.S. Census Data, we show a strong negative relationship be-
tween income and household size. We then document that there is a negative relationship between
income and the ratio of households’ public to private consumption expenditures. To do so, we clas-
sify expenditures from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and from the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA) as household public goods or private goods. In the cross-section
from the CEX, the highest income quintile has a ratio of public to private consumption expendi-
tures that is 20 percent lower than that of the poorest quintile. In the time series from the NIPA,
we note that over the last 50 years the aggregate ratio of household public to private consumption
has fallen by 40 percent.
An overlapping generations model formalizes our story. Adults have preferences over a private
good, a household public good, and the number of their own children in the household. They can
choose to live with roommates, who help bear the cost of the household public goods, but ﬁnding
roommates and maintaining good relationships takes time. The optimal number of roommates and
the consumption of household public goods are linked: households with more roommates ﬁnd
it optimal to consume more household public goods due to the low price, and adults who want
more household public goods ﬁnd it optimal to have more roommates to share the costs. If the
utility function displays more curvature in public than in private goods, then higher incomes lead
to a higher expenditure share on private goods in our model. Relatively lower public consumption
decreases the beneﬁt of living with adults, so household sizes fall. A similar channel applies
to children: over time, parents devote a higher share of their expenditures to private goods for
their children, effectively making children more expensive and leading to a decline in the number
of children per household. Thus, the model features a quality-quantity tradeoff with respect to
children that is directly tied to the (changing) composition of the consumption basket.
We calibrate the model using the cross sectional data on the relationships among income,
household size, and the relative consumption of public to private goods. We then change incomes
exogenously over time (e.g., due to technological progress) and ask to what extent rising incomes
alone could have caused the fall in household size. In the data, the number of adults per household
1On July 13, 2009, the front page of the Wall Street Journal featured a story of couples who delayed the decision
to dissolve their marriages due to the current recession.
2fell by 1.2 between 1850 and 2000, while the number of children per household fell by 1.9. The
model predicts a decline of about half an adult and a third of a child over the same time horizon.
Thus, the model can account for about one-third of the observed change in the number of adults
and one-sixth of the observed change in the number of children in the household. We computed
these results assuming a constant age composition of the population over time. When adjusting for
the changing age composition of the population, the model predicts a larger decline of 0.64 adults
and of 0.55 children. These ﬁndings suggest that rising demand for private goods may have con-
tributed signiﬁcantly to the changes in the living arrangements of Americans over the last century
and a half.
Our quantitative model also has implications for the resources saved given the changes in living
arrangements. We ﬁnd that the time spent meeting roommates and maintaining relationships in
2000 corresponds to 7 percent of GDP. Given today’s smaller households, this ﬁgure is about
25 percent lower than in 1850. We also ﬁnd that the total cost of a child (time plus goods) has
increased by about 20 percent over the same time span. The reason is that richer parents choose to
tilt their consumption bundles towards more private consumption, for themselves and also for their
children.
Most of the theoretical literature on household formation focuses on a particular margin of fam-
ily formation such as marriage, divorce, fertility, or the importance of the extended family. A rare
exception is Thomas K. Burch & Beverly J. Matthews (1987) who point to a general trend towards
“simpler” households and argue in favor of a general theory of household formation. Another no-
table exception is John F. Ermisch (1981) who builds and estimates a static model of household
formation. However, no attempt is made to assess how well the model can account for changes
in living arrangements over time. Raquel Fern´ andez, Nezih Guner & John Knowles (2005) and
Jeremy Greenwood, Nezih Guner & John Knowles (2003) also study several margins of living
together in models that emphasize the importance of income and search frictions. These papers do
not seek to explain the long-term patterns documented here. John C. Beresford & Alice M. Rivlin
(1966) are probably the ﬁrst to emphasize a rising “demand for privacy” as a factor in changing
living arrangements, but have no formal model. Michael Byalsky, Michael Keren & David Lev-
hari (1999) argue that a shift from public to private services may have caused a decline in optimal
kibbutz-size in Israel during the 20th century.
In contrast, analyses that focus on a particular change in family arrangements (and thus house-
hold size) abound. Quantitatively, the most signiﬁcant change has been the fertility decline. A
strong (negative) relationship between fertility and income exists, both over time and in the cross
section (Larry E. Jones & Mich` ele Tertilt 2008). A large literature investigates changes in fertility
patterns over the last two centuries, some focusing on the overall decline, and some on the baby
3boom.2 It is often argued that the negative income-fertility relationship is due to parents trading
off quantity of children for quality of children, which typically means more human capital or time
investment per child (Gary S. Becker & H. Gregg Lewis 1973). Our model introduces an interest-
ing variant to the quantity-quality theory by suggesting that parents are choosing endogenously to
allocate more private goods to their children while having fewer children.
A small body of work exists analyzing other margins of family formation. Several authors
focus on the age at which young people leave their parents’ homes, and point to earnings of young
adults and house prices as the main factors (Donald R. Haurin, Patric H. Hendershott & Dongwook
Kim 1994, John Ermisch & Pamela Di Salvo 1997, Alessandra Fogli 2004). Income (particularly
old-age pensions) also seems to play a role in the increased tendency for the elderly to live alone
(Dora L. Costa 1997, Dora L. Costa 1999, Kathleen McGarry & Robert F. Shoeni 2000, Carlos
Bethencourt & Jos´ e-V´ ıctor R´ ıos-Rull 2009). Other authors analyze the decline in marriage and in-
crease in divorce. For example, Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner (2009) offer a model to explain
the decline in marriage and the increase in divorce, arguing that technological progress in the home
production sector made people increasingly more able to live in smaller households. Michael J.
Brien, Lee A. Lillard & Steven N. Stern (2006) study the determinants of cohabitation, marriage
and divorce in a model with frictions and heterogeneous match quality. Ferdinando Regalia &
Jos´ e-V´ ıctor R´ ıos-Rull (2001) explore the rise of single female and single mother households in the
United States based on the increase in relative wages of women.
Each of these papers emphasizes speciﬁc features of a particular form of cohabitation. Some
of these papers also analyze how rising incomes affect that particular form of cohabitation. Our
approach differs primarily in modeling income as a factor that affects all forms of cohabitation si-
multaneously. Since the rise in income has been large and widespread, we ﬁnd it useful to ask how
far one can go with a model that abstracts from speciﬁc relationships between household members
and instead focuses on the factor common to all forms of cohabitation: the sharing of public goods.
Our results suggest that about one-third of changes in household size can be understood with this
model. This leaves the remaining two-thirds to be explained by other factors or changes in speciﬁc
institutions such as the introduction of social security, changes in divorce laws, or changes in tax
laws affecting the incentives to get married.
The next section documents changes in household size in the U.S. In Section 3 we present
evidence for the channel proposed in this paper. Section 4 sets up the model and derives some
2See for example Oded Galor & David N. Weil (1996) on women’s wages, Matthias Doepke (2004) on human
capital and child labor laws, Jeremy Greenwood & Ananth Seshadri (2002) on the role of new household technolo-
gies, and Larry E. Jones & Alice Schoonbroodt (forthcoming) on changes in mortality. Papers on the baby boom
include Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti (2009), Jeremy Greenwood, Ananth Seshadri & Guillaume Vanden-
broucke (2005) and Matthias Doepke, Moshe Hazan Hazan & Yishay Maoz (2007). This literature has grown greatly
in recent years; see Larry E. Jones, Alice Schoonbroodt & Mich` ele Tertilt (forthcoming) for a survey.
4basic theoretical results. The calibration is described in Section 5, while Section 6 presents our
results. Section 7 concludes. Additional details on the data are provided in the Appendix.
2 Changes in Household Size and Composition
Overthecourseofdevelopment, therehasbeenastrongtrendtowardssmallerhouseholds. FrancesE.
Kobrin (1976) documents that household sizes in the United States have been falling since 1790.
Peter Laslett (1969) documents a similar phenomenon in England – although arguing that the de-
cline did not start until the early 20th century. Simon Kuznets (1978) uses cross-country data to
show that more developed countries tend to have smaller households.
In this section we use Census data to shed more light on changes in household size and com-
position in the United States over the last century and a half.3 Using micro data allows us to
distinguish between family and household size, to analyze household size over the life cycle, and
to document changes in household composition. Micro data also enable us to analyze the relation-
ship between household size and income in the cross section. We use adults (18 years of age or
older) as the unit of observation. Focusing on the average adult, instead of on the average house-
hold, helps us avoid any under-representation of people living in large households. Even more
importantly, it allows us to perform analyses by age without looking only at households heads.4
Figure 1 shows the dramatic decline in household size from 1850 to 2000. The total number
of household members for the average adult fell by about 50 percent, from 6.2 in 1850 to 3.1 in
2000. But this drop is not just another illustration of the fertility decline of the 19th century. To see
this, we decompose average household size into adults (18 years of age and above) and children
(under 18 years of age). The number of adults declined by more than one person, from 3.5 to
2.3, while the number of children decreased by almost two children, from 2.7 to 0.8. One might
think that the decline in adult household members was driven mostly by changes in the family
structure.5 While changing family structure played an important role, it should be noted that non-
family living arrangements declined as well. The number of non-family members is simply the
gap between household and family members in Figure 1. While in 1850 the average person lived
3We use the publicly available data from IPUMS (Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A.
Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King & Chad Ronnander 2009). See Steven Ruggles & Susan
Brower (2003) for a description. A more detailed description of the data analysis is presented in Appendix A1.1.
4This distinction is important because most people are not household heads most of the time, and heads of house-
holds have different household sizes from that of the average American. For example, in 2000, only 39% of 25 year
old persons were household heads. While the average 25 year old person lived in a household of size 3.3, the average
household size for heads of households aged 25 is only 2.5. The difference is larger the older the Census is. Further-
more, the fraction of individuals heading their own household at a given age has exhibited signiﬁcant changes over
time.
5Families in the U.S. Census are subsets of households that are related by blood, marriage, or adoption.
5with one non-family member (i.e. a person not related by blood, marriage, or adoption), such
arrangements had become almost nonexistent by 2000. In other words, sharing households with
unrelated individuals, a common practice in the 19th century, essentially had disappeared by the
middle of the 20th century.
To conﬁrm further that the trend is not only a decline in marriage and fertility, we also de-
compose household size into different member categories, classifying each person according to
his or her relationship to the household head. Figure 2 shows this decomposition for the years
1850 and 2000. The Figure shows a decline in household members in almost every category: in
2000 there were fewer spouses, fewer children (both minors and adult children), fewer parents,
siblings, grand-children, other relatives, and non-relatives in the household, compared to 1850.
The only exception is the category “partners, friends, and visitors”, which reﬂects the recent rise
in nonmarried partners. This increase, however, is more than offset by the decline in spouses.



















































Source: U.S. Census. Excludes group quarters. The unit of observation is an adult, so
that each point represents the average household size across adults.
The reduction in household size has occurred at all stages of the life cycle. In Figure 3 we
plot the number of household members by age group for each census year. Age groups span ﬁve
years and are labeled by the middle year. The main point here is that the entire proﬁle has shifted
down almost uniformly. Young adults (18 to 22) live in larger households than 23-27 year old
adults. Persons in their mid-40s have the largest households, and the elderly the smallest. We have
also constructed a life cycle proﬁle following cohorts across different censuses (not reported here),
which conﬁrms the downward shift in the household size age proﬁle.
In sum, the number of household members for the average adult has decreased by half over the
last 150 years. The average adult lives in a household with fewer members of every type: fewer
spouses, young children, adult children, siblings, and especially fewer non-family members. The
decline has occurred at all ages. Given the universality of the decline, we believe it is worthwhile to

















































































































































Source: U.S. Census. The unit of observation is an adult. Each bar represents the mean number of
household members in each category.
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Age Group
Source: U.S. Census. The unit of observation is an adult, so that each point represents the average
household size across adults. Age groups are composed of ﬁve years and are labeled by the middle
year.
pursue an analysis of household size that abstracts from speciﬁc events such as marriage, divorce
and children moving out of the household and focuses instead on the common elements of all these
decisions.
73 Increasing Demand for Private Consumption
The idea we pursue in this paper is that household public goods are a key reason for living to-
gether, the beneﬁt of a larger household being a lower cost (per capita) of the public goods. If the
income elasticity of public goods is lower than that of private goods, then public goods become
relatively less important as incomes increase which would cause a decline in optimal household
size. We use cross-sectional data to investigate the presence of this mechanism. First, if income
is an important determinant of household size, then one would also expect richer people to live
in smaller households at any point in time. Second, if the mechanism works through differential
demand for household public goods, then one would expect the ratio of public to private goods to
vary systematically across people with different income levels.
We start by analyzing the relationship between income and household size. We ﬁnd a strong
negative relationship between per capita income and size. In fact, poorer adults live with more
adults and more children. Speciﬁcally, we use 2000 U.S. Census data to compute the household
size by age group and income quintile.6 For almost all age groups, we ﬁnd that adults in the
highest income quintile live with fewer adults and fewer children than do adults at the bottom of
the income distribution.7 Table 1 presents household sizes for two age groups, 23-27 and 28-32.
We ﬁnd that average household size differs by more than one adult between the top and bottom
quintile. The relationship is monotone across all quintiles. Further, the negative relationship is
present for various measures of household size: adults only, children only, family members only,
as well as non-family members. The negative relationship holds for almost all age groups. The
average income elasticity for the number of adults in the household is -0.10, while for children
it is -0.05. The only exceptions are young adults (18-22 years) where we ﬁnd a (small) positive
relationship between income and adult household size, and older adults (38-47, and 73+) where we
ﬁnd a (small) positive relationship between income and number of children in the household. This
exception might be due to the differential timing of child-bearing for women of different education
levels (and hence income). More educated women typically have children later in life, which might
explain why the number of children in the household for older Americans is positively correlated
with income. Details are reported in Table A3.
Above we documented that the decline in household size over time has been visible across all
categories of household members (see Figure 2). One might wonder to what extent the same holds
6Income for each adult is measured as household income divided by the number of adults in the household.
7A negative relationship between income and household size has been noted previously in the literature. Early
work by Dorothy S. Brady (1958) and Beresford & Rivlin (1966) uses data tabulations to support such a relationship.
More detailed work is provided by Robert T. Michael, Victor R. Fuchs & Sharon R. Scott (1980) and Fred C. Pampel
(1983), who use cross-state variation and individual microdata to study the relationship between income and household
size. Ermisch (1981) provides evidence of the same relationship in the 1973 and 1976 General Household Surveys of
Britain, where he estimates an income elasticity of household size of -0.20.
8true in the cross section. In fact, as in the time series, richer individuals in the cross section share a
household with fewer adult children, fewer parents, siblings, grand-children, other relatives, part-
ners and friends, as well as with fewer non-relatives (see Figure 4). The two exceptions are the
categories spouses and children under age 18, which are both higher numbers for richer house-
holds. The reason is that we are not controlling for age in this ﬁgure and that both children in the
household and income are hump-shaped over the life-cycle. Once controlling for age, the relation-
ship between income and children in the household is negative, as shown in Table 1. In sum, while
the time series and cross section do not line up perfectly, they do display a lot of similarities.







































































































































Relationship to Head Relationship to Head
Note: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Census data. The unit of observation is an adult. Each
bar represents the mean number of household members in each category.
Table 1: Average Household Size by Income Quintiles, 2000
23-27 year old persons 28-32 year old persons
Quintile Total Family Adults Children Total Family Adults Children
1 3.95 3.26 2.72 1.23 4.12 3.58 2.49 1.62
2 3.94 3.27 2.80 1.14 4.13 3.59 2.57 1.56
3 3.56 3.02 2.60 0.96 3.80 3.40 2.38 1.42
4 3.09 2.65 2.40 0.69 3.33 3.03 2.15 1.18
5 2.75 2.38 2.31 0.44 2.81 2.58 1.99 0.82
Note: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Census data. The unit of observation is an adult. Income for each adult is
computed as income per capita for adults within the household.
Moving to the second part of the hypothesis, we show some direct evidence on the increasing
demand for private goods. To do so, we compute measures of public and private goods in the data
and analyze how much they vary with income – both over time and in the cross section. To do this,
9we classify consumption goods as public or private. We perform this classiﬁcation on aggregate
data from the National Economic Accounts (NIPA) for which we have a time series starting in
1929. We also use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for which we have more detailed
information on consumption items, but only for a short period of time. We also use the numbers
found in the CEX data throughout the rest of the paper.
Classifying goods into private and public is not trivial; many goods have some private and some
public characteristics. However, to map the data into our conceptual framework we need to cate-
gorize goods into these two extremes, and doing so requires strong assumptions. The overarching
principle we use is to classify goods based on “technology of usage,” essentially asking the ques-
tion: can a good be used by several individuals at the same time? For some goods, such as movie
or bus tickets, the answer is clearly no, and they are classiﬁed as private. For more complicated
situations, we assume that any good that could be shared is public unless typically it is not shared
for one of the following ﬁve reasons: timing, depreciation, hygiene, taste, or ﬁt.8 The method is
described in more detail in Appendix A1.2. Using these principles, we classify the following as
private goods: school tuition, health expenditures, personal care, clothing, public transportation,
and food away from home. Public goods include housing, utilities, most durables, cars and related
expenditures, and household appliances. We also classify food consumed at home as a public good.
We do so because Angus Deaton & Christina Paxson (1998) and several subsequent papers ﬁnd
that food consumed at home has public good characteristics (Li Gan & Victoria Vernon 2003, An-
gus Deaton & Christina Paxson 2003). This ﬁnding seems to apply to historical and recent data on
expenditure patterns (Trevon D. Logan 2010). In particular, larger households spend less per capita
on food when total expenditures are kept constant. One potential explanation is that there are un-
modeled economies of scale in food production. Finally, note that we do not consider whether (or
not) a given household actually shares the goods classiﬁed as public.9 If richer people use public
goods in a more private fashion, then our estimate of the income elasticity of the ratio of public
to private consumption would be a lower bound on the actual elasticity, implying that the channel
could be more important than indicated by our analysis.
We start by using NIPA data published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis to analyze the long
term trend in the ratio of public to private expenditures. Unfortunately, these data are available only
after 1929. Figure 5 presents the behavior of the ratio, which has declined from 2.0 in 1929 to 1.34
in 2006. This is a drop of about one third.10 The main item driving the increase in private goods
8For example, while tooth brushes could in principle be shared, most people do not share them for hygienic
reasons; a bed could in principle be shared, however, most people do not take turns using a bed since they would need
it at the same time; clothing could in principle be shared, however, this is unlikely to be practical because of ﬁt. All of
these goods are thus classiﬁed as private.
9For example, we are not considering whether some years ago household members shared a TV while today each
member may have his own television.
10There is a level difference between the NIPA and CEX data because the NIPA data include all of GDP while the
10over the entire period is medical care, which has increased from 3% of total expenditures to 17%.
Expenditure shares of other private goods including education, recreation, and personal care also
have increased. In contrast, the clothing expenditure share has fallen over time. As for public
goods, the main item is food (purchased for off-premise consumption) which has decreased from
19% of total expenditures in 1929 to 8% today.
Figure 5: Personal Consumption Expenditures:





































































































































Note: Author’s calculations based on National Economic Accounts.
The decrease in the ratio of public to private goods shown by the historical aggregate series
provides suggestive evidence in favor of our mechanism. However, this phenomenon could also
be explained by changing relative prices. To circumvent this problem, we compare expenditure
patterns along the income distribution in a cross-section, where relative prices are ﬁxed. We use
data from the Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX), which contains detailed information on
household expenditure. We pool data from 1995 to 2000 and treat it as a single cross section.
Given the ﬁner classiﬁcation of goods in the CEX compared to the National Accounts data, we
can break down goods more carefully into public and private categories. As before we use adults
as the unit of observation. For each adult we construct the ratio of expenditures on public goods
to expenditures on private goods for the household. Our measure of income is household income
per adult. Figure 6 presents the ratio of public to private goods expenditures by income quintile,
averaged across ages. The ratio is lower for higher quintiles, supporting our hypothesis. For the
poorest quintile it is 3.6 compared to 2.9 for the richest quintile, a 24% difference. As in the
Census data, we ﬁnd a strong negative relationship between income and household size in the
CEX. Overall then, people in the lower quintiles have larger households and spend relatively more
on public goods, while people in higher quintiles have smaller households and spend relatively
CEX data include only consumers’ out-of-pocket expenditures. The dip during World War II is due to the government
slowing or halting production of housing and consumer durables to redistribute resources towards the war effort.
11more on private goods. We perform the same exercise classifying adults into different age groups
(of ﬁve years each) and ﬁnd that in all cases the income elasticity of the ratio of expenditures in
public to private goods is negative. The average elasticity across all 12 age groups is -0.091. See
Appendix A1.2 for more details.
Some of the choices we made to classify goods might be arguable. We address the most
obvious criticisms in a series of robustness checks reported in the Appendix. We exclude some
of the most controversial goods from our analysis entirely and ﬁnd similar patterns. We classify
care services (such as babysitting and adult care) as private and obtain slightly lower elasticity
estimates. Interpreting public goods generously by including all goods that have the potential to be
shared reduces the elasticity estimate by roughly a quarter. Finally, reclassifying car products and
car services as private lowers the elasticity estimate by most. However, we ﬁnd negative elasticities
for each of the robustness checks. While the exact magnitudes differ across the different robustness
exercises, the fact that the ratio of public to private goods decreases systematically with income is
extremely robust.
Figure 6: Ratio of Expenditures on Public to Private Goods
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on CEX data, 1995-2000. Income quintiles, aggregate H, and
aggregateV are calculated separately for each age; the quintile results in the Figure are the average
across ages.
124 The Model
We use an inﬁnite horizon overlapping generations model. There are children and adults in the
model, but only adults make choices. Adults decide each period whom to live with and what
quantities of private and household public goods to consume.
4.1 Households
Households are collections of roommates (adults and children) who live together for the purpose
of sharing the costs of household public goods. The tradeoff is that living with others takes time
that could otherwise be spent in the labor market. In each period, each adult imposes a cost of B
units of time on each other adult in the household. This cost represents the time it takes to ﬁnd
roommates and to maintain the necessary relationships. In each period, each child imposes a cost
of Bk units of time on his parent.11 In this case, these costs capture the time it takes to care for a
child. We also allow the costs of living with other people to vary by (own) age: Ba and Bk
a, where a
is the age of the adult. The differing costs by age capture life cycle effects. For example, Ba might
be low for young people as everyone else is single too, and ﬁnding a partner or roommate is easy.
Older people will spend a lot more time searching for roommates. We can also capture the fact
that fecundity declines with age by letting Bk
a increase in age.
Households, then, are clubs comprised of adults and children sharing household public goods.
Generally, this approach introduces two problems. Modeling the optimal sorting of people with
different tastes into local clubs is difﬁcult.12 Similarly, with heterogeneous household members,
specifying how members bargain over spending on public vs. private goods would be quite dif-
ﬁcult. We get around these issues by assuming that only identical types, i.e. adults of the same
age and productivity (and their children), can live together. This is a strong assumption and pre-
vents the analysis of some dimensions of household heterogeneity (such as the rise in two earner
couples). However, for analyzing aggregate trends in household size, it is a useful simplifying as-
sumption because it allows us to abstract from club formation and household bargaining. We also
abstract from issues of enforceability or possible free riding. Further, we assume that households
can be formed and dissolved each period at no cost. That is, there is no ﬁxed cost of setting up a
household and no household capital stock that links household size over a person’s life. Again, we
make this assumption mostly for simplicity. Age variation in the costs of living together can be
thought of as one way to capture this capital stock.
11For simplicity, and as is standard in the fertility literature, we assume there is only one parent per child. Essen-
tially a household in our model is formed by adults who live together as roommates, each bringing along their own
children.
12See David Lam ((1983), (1984), (1988)) for an analysis of households as clubs.
13Since we make a distinction between consumers and households, we use upper case letters to
denote quantities per household, and lower case letters to denote per capita quantities.
4.2 Consumers
Adults derive utility from two distinct consumption goods. The ﬁrst consumption good is denoted
by v, and we assume it is consumed privately by a particular adult. The second consumption good
is denoted by H and is a local public good, i.e. it can be shared non-rivalrously with all household
members. The assumption is that v and H are two very distinct types of goods, some that are
inherently difﬁcult to share (such as health care and education) and others that are inherently easy
to share (such as housing and other durables). Given this speciﬁcation, an adult who lives alone
alsoconsumesbothtypesofgoods, eventhoughtherearenoeconomiesofscaleintheconsumption
of H for a one-person household.
Adults also derive utility from the number and well-being of their own children. The number of
children of a given adult is denoted by k (for kids). Children, like all other people in the household,
derive utility from consuming the household public good, H, but also from their allocation of
private goods, vk. People care about other adults in the household only indirectly: they help ﬁnance
the cost of the public good. There is no reason for living together other than that it is cheaper. Let
S be the number of adults in a household. In equilibrium all adults make the same decision about
how many children to live with, so there are K = Sk total children in the household.
Let U(v;H;k;vk) denote the period utility function of an adult. Throughout the paper we will















Note that adults care about their own and their children’s consumption bundles in the household
in the same way. The relative weight that adults put on children’s utility is denoted by d > 0. We
allow for decreasing marginal utility from additional children through the exponent a 2 (0;1).13
The non-homothetic formulation (when s 6= f) allows for non-linear Engel curves, which are
important for capturing expenditure patterns seen in the data. Finally, w ¸ 0 is a parameter that
determines the relative importance of public vs. private consumption goods.
In the previous section we documented strong patterns in household size by age and income, so
we allow for two corresponding dimensions of heterogeneity. First, we assume a ﬁnite number of
productivity types, denoted by i. Labor productivity is a function of the type (capturing differences
13a = 1 would mean that adults care about the sum of utilities across all children.
14in ability across people) and year (capturing general technological progress as well as capital ac-
cumulation). We denote productivity of a consumer of type i in year t by z(t;i).14 Second, people
differ in their age. Each consumer is indexed by his or her birth year t. Consumers live for a ﬁnite
number of ages, indexed by a 2 f0;:::;Ag. Thus, a consumer who is born in year t is a = t ¡t
years old in year t.15
An adult in this economy maximizes life-time utility by choosing a basket of consumption
goods (v;H;vk) and a household size and composition (S;k) for each point in her life-cycle, subject
to a life-time budget constraint. We denote consumption of the private good of a person of type
i, born in year t, at age a by v(t;a;i). The same notation is used for all other goods as well as
for the household sizes. We also assume fully functioning asset markets, and denote the price of


























k(t;a;i) ¸ 0 8a and S(t;a;i) ¸ 1 8a
v(t;a;i);h(t;a;i);vk(t;a;i) ¸ 0
The constraint S(t;a;i) ¸ 1 indicates that all adults have to live at least with themselves, and
further that there is no cost of living alone.
Note that the budget set for this problem is non-convex. Deﬁne h= H
S as per adult expenditures
on the public good and Vk = kvk as total child expenditures. With this change of variables, the
















The parameters of this utility function are restricted in several ways in our calibration. First,
14For simplicity, we abstract from human capital accumulation over the life cycle. The implied life-cycle earnings
proﬁles are increasing, but only in line with increases in GDP per capita.
15Note that we do not model the transition from childhood to adulthood explicitly here. Our model is simply a
model of adults who choose also how many children to have in the household, but there is no fertility choice that
determines the number of adults in the next generation.
15we focus our attention on the standard Barro-Becker case, 0 < a < 1 and s;f < 1.16 Second,
we need further conditions to ensure that the utility function is concave. s > 0:5 is necessary for
concavity in h and S. Further, 0 < f < 1 and 1 < a +f < 2 is sufﬁcient (although not necessary)
for concavity in k; our calibration satisﬁes these parameter restrictions. Finally, for our story to
hold it is necessary that s >f. We provide intuition to this effect below, and use the data to inform
us about the relative values of these two parameters.
4.3 Equilibrium
We assume a small open economy, so that the interest rate rt is given exogenously. An equilibrium
is then simply deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Anequilibriumisanallocationfv(t;a;i);H(t;a;i);vk(t;a;i)gt;i;a, ahouseholdcom-
position fS(t;a;i);k(t;a;i)gt;i;a and prices fp(t)gt such that:
1. Each agent (t;i) maximizes problem (1).
2.
pt
pt+1 = 1+rt+1 for all t.
4.4 Model Properties
Letting l be the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint and, for ease of exposition, omitting





v : bt+awv¡f = lp
vk : bt+adka¡1w(vk)¡f = lp











The ﬁrst equation shows that the marginal beneﬁt of an additional adult in the household is
higher, the higher the consumption of the public good H is. The second equation gives the costs
and beneﬁts of private good consumption, v. When income is higher (a lower multiplier on the
16An alternative well-deﬁned parameter speciﬁcation could start with a < 0 and s;f > 1 (Jones & Schoonbroodt
forthcoming).
16budget constraint), households consume more private goods, v. The next two ﬁrst order conditions
display similar effects for the other two consumption goods, vk and H. However, things are a
little more complicated here, as the number of children, k, and adults, S, also enter. The marginal
beneﬁt of additional vk consumption declines in the number of children, as children and per-child
consumption are substitutes in the utility function.17 In contrast, the marginal utility of public
consumption increases both in the number of adults and children in the household, since more
people beneﬁt from the public consumption good. The last equation shows that an increase in the
marginal cost of children (pvk + pzBk
a) reduces the optimal number of children. Finally, in this
set-up the marginal cost of an additional child increases in desired private child consumption, vk.
Combining the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to H and S, we can derive an equation that

















This expression shows how the optimal number of adults is related to its cost. Assuming the
optimal number of children does not vary much with Ba, we can see that adult household size is
higher precisely during those ages when the cost is lower (recall that s > 0:5).
To gain some additional intuition on the workings of the model, consider a simpliﬁed version
of the model with d =0 (i.e. without children) and assume people live for one period only. The last
assumption makes the budget constraint and feasibility coincide and hence it is easy to solve the
model explicitly. In particular, using the ﬁrst order conditions and the one-period budgetconstraint,







f +2BS(z) = 1+B
Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive conditions under which an increase in income













We have already assumed s > 0:5, so s > f guarantees that this expression is negative. When
s > f, Engel curves are nonlinear and private goods are a relative luxury good. Higher income
17Note, however, that in this formulation, children and total child consumption, kvk, are complements. See Jones
& Schoonbroodt (forthcoming).
17households devote a higher fraction of income to private goods, so the incentives to form house-
holds decline.












We have already shown that S falls in income when s >f. If in addition f >2s ¡1, then the right
hand side increases directly through the increase in z and indirectly through the decrease in S, so
that households with higher incomes are guaranteed to have higher private to public consumption




ration of the model shows that the same logic applies more broadly. Generally, under the parameter
restrictions derived above, higher income leads to a higher expenditure share on private goods and
accordingly smaller (adult) household sizes. This ﬁnding holds for different types within a cohort,
across cohorts, and over the life cycle. We also conﬁrm numerically that as long as s > f, Engel
curves are such that vk increases faster than H, which makes children endogenously more costly.
This leads to a fall in the number of children. Thus, our model features a quality-quantity trade-off
that works through the endogenous choice of private goods for children.
5 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the model to measure the quantitative importance of our channel over
the last 150 years. We calibrate the parameters to match a rich set of moments based on Census
and CEX data from 2000 and 1995-2000. In particular, the calibration uses the variation in income
and household size in the cross section to pin down parameter values. We use the calibrated model
to simulate changes in income and then evaluate the effects on household size and the associated
change in expenditures on public and private goods. In other words, we project the model back to
1850, when income was lower, and assess what fraction of the overall decline in living together
can be accounted for by the model.
A model period is ﬁve years. We set A=12, corresponding to age bins 18-22, 23-27, ..., 68-72,
73+ in the data. We use an annual discount factor of 0:97, which, given our model period of 5
years, implies b = 0:975. We set the exogenous interest rate equal to 4.89% annually. This is the
interest rate that would arise endogenously in a model with logarithmic utility, a discount factor
18of 0.97 and the average annual growth rate of 1.74% that we use, as we explain below. It is also
within the range of interest rates reported in the data.18
We use income per capita as our measure of labor productivity, z. Since we are interested in
long-term trends, we feed in the average growth rate, rather than annual variations. On average,
GDP per capita has been growing at 1.74% annually over the last century and a half.19 We assume
there are ﬁve types of agents, i, each corresponding to an income quintile. We assume workers
stay in the same quintiles over their lifetime. Further, we assume that the relative positions of
these ﬁve quintiles are constant over time. We construct the relative income of the ﬁve quintiles
based on per capita household income across quintiles in the CEX data (as described in Appendix
A1.2 and reported in Table A2). This method gives the following multiples of average income
for the ﬁve quintiles: (z1;z2;z3;z4;z5) = (0:20;0:55;0:83;1:20;2:23). Then z(t;a;i) is set equal to
z(t;a;i) = ziYt+a, where Yt+a is GDP per capita in year t +a.






a=1) using a rich set of moments from the 2000 U.S. Census and from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (1995-2000). One set of moments consists of the cross-sectional values for
the number of adults (S) and children (K) in the household for each age group, which are obtained
from Census data. We also include income elasticities for the number of adults and children by
age group, which we constructed using CEX information. The next set of moments consists of the
income elasticities of the ratio of public to private expenditures, as described in Section 3. Since
we estimated the elasticity separately for each age group, this gives an additional 12 moments.
Lastly, we use that the average child requires about 4% of an adult’s time budget.20 A complete
list of the moments, together with the model analogues, is presented in Table A3.
In total, we have 61 moments: S, K, and the income elasticities of S, K, and H=(V +Vk),
for each of the twelve age groups; plus average time spent on children. Given that we have 29
parameters, this results in an overidentiﬁed system where we cannot match each moment exactly.
18Good interest rate data is notoriously difﬁcult to obtain and estimates vary widely depending on which measure
of interest rates is used. For example, short-term returns on U.S. government securities yield an average interest rate
around 1-1.5% (John H. Cochrane 2001). Peter Rupert & Paul Gomme (2007) argue that the return to capital is a more
appropriate measure of interest rates for calibration purposes. Long-term returns on equity for developed countries
averages 7.1% (Robert J. Barro 2006) while Edward C. Prescott (1986) argues that standard calibrations of RBC
models imply a real interest rate of 4%. The number we use is close to the midpoint of the range of reported numbers.
19This number is based on Louis D. Johnston & Samuel H. Williamson (2006).
20The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004) provides data on time spent with children drawn from the 2004 American
Time Use Survey (ATUS). Based on their estimates, we calculate two notions of the time cost of children. Direct time
is only the time spent caring for and helping children, as denoted by the respondents. Indirect time is the difference
between time spent on all household tasks for households with and without children. ATUS separates households into
those with and without children under 6; we use the 2000 Census to weight these two observations together, and to
transform total time into average time per child. We then divide by 16 working hours per day to ﬁnd an estimate of the
fraction of the time budget. For direct time, the resulting estimate is 3.84%; for indirect time, it is 4.73%. We use 4%
in our calibration.
19Instead, weminimizeaweightedleast-squareslossfunction. Theexactlossfunctionisdescribedin
Appendix A2. Intuitively, the average levels of S and K by age group pin down the cost parameters
(B and Bk). The elasticities of S, K, and H=(V +Vk) help identify the elasticity parameters in the
utility function a, s, and f. Finally, the average child care time helps pin down d separately from
the level of time costs Bk
a.
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter a d w s f
Value 0.334 0.123 4.082 0.735 0.690
Figure 7: Costs of Household Formation over Life Cycle
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Table 2 gives the calibrated parameters (a;d;w;s;f).21 The procedure yields s > f, which
is consistent with the hypothesized non-homotheticity in preferences for private and public goods,
although the difference between the two parameters is relatively small. Figure 7 shows the time
costs of having adults and children in the household. The cost of an additional adult increases
almost linearly with age. The cost of children is tied closely to (lagged) biological constraints
faced by parents, particularly mothers.
21Our calibration shows that the objective function is fairly ﬂat: a number of different parameterizations ﬁt nearly
as well. However, they also yield similar results.
205.1 Fit
The calibrated model generally ﬁts the data well. Figure 8 compares the model-predicted proﬁles
of S and K by age with the data. The data and model series agree closely. The shape by age group
is determined by the full set of B and Bk parameters.
Figure 8: Cross-Section Proﬁles of Household Size
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The critical element of our calibration is the relationship between income and the choice vari-
ables, which led us to target the cross-sectional elasticities as our main moments. The model
should ﬁt the cross-sectional relationship between income and S, K, and the H=(V +Vk) reason-
ably well before it is used to assess the mechanism in the time series. Figure 9a shows the log of
the H=(V +Vk) ratio by income quintile, averaged across all ages for each income quintile. The
model ﬁts the data elasticities quite closely. The values for the model and the data are shown on
different scales, indicating that the levels of the two are quite different. Given that the level was
not included in our calibration targets, the poor ﬁt here is not surprising. We do not see this as a
major weakness as what matters for our mechanism is the elasticity rather than the level.22
Figure 9b shows adult and child household sizes by income quintile, averaged across all ages. It
demonstrates that the model matches the negative relationship between income and size quite well
on average, indicating a good ﬁt of the elasticity. The model and data values for each individual
moment are presented in Table A3.
22In experiments not reported here, we have tried to include the level as a calibration target. The resulting better
match comes at the cost of ﬁtting the elastiticies more poorly. This tradeoff is not surprising in an over-identiﬁed
model.
21Figure 9: Actual and Predicted Relationships with Income
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6 Results
We project the model back to 1850, assuming income has grown at an annual rate of 1.74 percent
between 1850 and 2000. Figure 10a presents the results for the number of adults in the household,
S. We include both the time series for the actual data and the results from the model. In the data,
the number of adults decreased from 3.5 in 1850 to 2.3 in 2000. The model predicts a decrease of
about half an adult, which is 37 percent of the actual fall.
Figure 10b shows the results for the number of children in the household, K. The data indicate
that in 1850 there were 2.7 children per household, while in 2000 there were 0.8. The model
generates a change of 0.31 children, i.e., it captures 16 percent of the total difference between
2000 and 1850.
An additional factor that has been left out of the analysis so far is the changing age structure of
the population. Falling mortality has led to population aging, which is relevant because the elderly
generally live with fewer adults and fewer children. To account for this effect, we obtain the actual
age composition of the population for each reported year. We use it to construct weighted results
that take into consideration changes in the demographic composition. These results are shown
in Figures 10a and 10b under the label Model-Weighted. Allowing for changes in mortality, the
model accounts for 53 percent of the change in the number of adults between 1850 and 2000, and
29 percent of the change in the number of children in the same period. Hence we conclude that
22Figure 10: Actual and Predicted Household Size
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one-third to one-half of the observed change in the number of adults, and one-sixth to one-third of
the observed change in the number of children, can be attributed to our mechanism where increases
in income endogenously decrease economies of scale within the household.
Figure 11 compares the actual and predicted ratios of expenditures on public goods to those on
private goods (H=(V +Vk)). The actual ratio is taken from Figure 5, i.e. based on U.S. NIPA data.
Both series are normalized to take a value of one in 1930. In the data, the H=(V +Vk) ratio in 2000
is 70% that of 1930, while in the model it is 90%. In sum, the drop in the ratio of public to private
consumption is about three times larger in the data compared to what the model would imply. This
is perhaps not surprising, given that other channels probably contributed to the decline in public
consumption. For example, falling prices for household public goods seem a likely candidate.23
6.1 Understanding the Mechanism
Inourmodel, agentsmakedecisionsaboutthenumberofadultstheywanttolivewith, theirnumber
of children, and a consumption basket composed of private and public goods. We are interested
in understanding how these components interact. To disentangle the different effects, we conduct
three experiments. In the ﬁrst, we set s = f, which implies homothetic preferences and therefore,
shuts down our proposed channel. In experiment two, we set d = 0, which means that there is no
23The importance of falling prices of household durable goods for changes in marriage and divorce is emphasized
in Greenwood & Guner (2009).
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utility value in having children. In experiment three, we set B = 0:25, which is a large enough cost
to make all adults want to live alone.
Table 3 presents the results of the three different experiments. For comparison, the ﬁrst row
presents the baseline results and the second one the weighted benchmark numbers. The experi-
ments each give unweighted results, so they should be compared to the ﬁrst row. Column 1 reports
the actual change in the number of adults between 1850 and 2000. Column 2 gives the implied
change in the number of adults that results from the calibrated model. Column 3 reports the propor-
tion of the actual change that can be explained by the model. Columns 4 to 6 present the analogous
results for children. In the ﬁrst experiment, we set s = 0:69 so that it is equal to the calibrated f.
When preferences are homothetic, the ratio of public to private goods consumed (H=(V +Vk)) is
unresponsive to changes in income. This implies that economies of scale within the household will
not be affected, which yields a constant optimal household size. There is no change in the number
of adults (Column 2) or in the number of children (Column 4).
The fourth row of Table 3 gives the results for the experiment with d = 0. There is obviously
no change in number of children (Column 5). Eliminating children implies that adults have some
free resources that they allocate optimally between private and public goods. Because adults are
richer in this sense, they choose to live with fewer adults. This effect is larger in 1850 (where
there are more children in the baseline case) than in 2000. Therefore, the fall in adult household
size in this experiment is smaller compared to the baseline decline. However, quantitatively the
difference is very modest. The model generates a decline of 0.43 adults in this experiment relative
to 0.45 in the baseline. In other words, while there is some interaction in the model between the
optimal child and adult household sizes, we ﬁnd that this interaction explains little about the U.S.
experience. One reason for the lack of interaction is that children are modeled as belonging to a
24Table 3: Predicted Change in S and K (1850-2000)
Adults D1850¡2000 Children D1850¡2000
Actual Model Model
Actual Actual Model Model
Actual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 1.20 0.45 0.37 1.89 0.31 0.16
Weighted 1.20 0.64 0.53 1.89 0.55 0.29
Homothetic (s = f) 1.20 0.00 0.00 1.89 0.00 0.00
No Children (d = 0) 1.20 0.43 0.36 1.89 0.00 0.00
One Adult (large B) 1.20 0.00 0.00 1.89 0.04 0.02
particular adult, not to the entire household. Thus, each adult has to pay for the consumption of
private goods for his or her children and therefore, living with other adults does not make children
cheaper.
Finally, we explore the case where adults are forced to live alone. We set a high enough cost
of living with other adults so that adults of all ages choose to live alone. Then, by construction,
the number of adults never changes (Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3). We ﬁnd that the fall in the
number of children in this experiment is very small; it explains only two percent of the change in
the number of children between 1850 and 2000 (Column 6). This shows that there is little direct
effect of growing incomes on the number of children. The decline in children per household works
primarily through a decline in adults per household, not a decline in children per adult.
Theseexperimentsteachseverallessonsaboutthemechanismofthemodel. First, non-homothetic
preferences are crucial for our story. Second, the mechanism is most useful for explaining adult
living arrangements. The number of children also declines, but due mostly to an indirect effect
that works through the number of adults. Finally, the reverse effect from children to adults is very
small.
6.2 Falling Cost of Roommates and Rising Child Expenditures
We now discuss some ancillary implications of the model. Our model emphasizes the cost of living
with other people, which is time spent forming and maintaining relationships with roommates and
children. Given that household sizes have fallen over time, we can use the model to back out the
resources saved due to changes in living arrangements. In particular, we construct the value of time
spent on household formation and maintenance costs relative to GDP. Figure 12 plots the average
household cost taken across all age groups and quintiles. We ﬁnd that the cost of living with other
25people is substantial; on average, the time spent dealing with roommates is valued at 7 percent of
GDP. Further, resources devoted to living arrangements have decreased by around 25 percent over
the last 150 years. In other words, the model suggests that the decline in household size has been
accompanied by substantial resource saving, about 2.5 percent of GDP.
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Note: Mean z[B(S¡1)+Bkk], across all age groups and quintiles divided by the mean
output, z[1¡B(S¡1)¡Bkk], also across all age groups and quintiles.
While the pure time cost of children has decreased (due to fewer children), people choose to
devote more resources to children, which leads to an increase in the total cost of children. This
distinction is shown in Figure 13, where we report three different measures of the costs of children.
The Figure shows the results for the age group 28 to 32 in the third income quintile. The lowest
line is simply the pure time cost of one child, Bk, which is constant by assumption. We then add
the child’s private consumption to construct a measure of the total cost of a child, which is plotted
as the middle line. This total cost displays a substantial increase, from 7.6 percent of a parent’s
time to 9 percent. In other words, total child costs per child have increased by about 20 percent,
which might be what people have in mind when they complain about the rising costs of raising
children.24 Rather than children becoming literally more expensive (which seems unlikely), our
model suggests that parents voluntarily choose to spend more resources on children, making each
child endogenously more expensive. Essentially there is a quantity-quality trade-off at work in this
model, although the mechanism is different from the usual one. The typical story is that higher
income parents invest more in their children, or substitute consumption per child for number of
children (Becker & Lewis 1973). In our formulation, the quantity-quality tradeoff arises naturally
24The U.S. Department of Agriculture produces an annual report measuring expenditures on children; in real terms,
expenditures increased about 20% between 1950 and 2008 (Mark Lino & Andrea Carlson 2009). This rise is often
reported as rising costs of children. See for example the November 12, 2007 Business Week special report, ”Is Raising
Kids a Fool’s Game?”
26from the composition of household consumption. While both public and private goods are normal
goods, private goods are assumed to expand more quickly with income, raising the de facto cost of
each child.
Figure 13: Cost of Children
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Cost of one child
Note: For age group 28 to 32 in the third income quintile. Cost of one child is equal to
(vk +Bkz)=z. Cost of all children in the household is equal to (vk +Bkz)K=z.
Finally, the total cost of all children in the household declines over time, as the top line in
Figure 13 shows. This is not surprising since the total number of children in the household falls
substantially over this period, and more than compensates for the increased cost per child.
7 Conclusion
Over the course of 150 years, the household of the average American has shrunk by half. The de-
cline was broad-based, affecting all forms of cohabitation for Americans of all ages. The negative
cross-sectional correlation between income and household sizes suggests that rising income might
have been a key force. The evidence we present on consumption patterns indicates that higher
incomes are accompanied by a greater relative preference for private over household public goods.
Since the primary purpose of roommates is to share the costs of local public goods, the declining
budget share of local public goods leads people to form smaller households endogenously. Hence,
optimally changing consumption bundles provide the link from income to household size. This
story is general to all living arrangements. Our approach abstracts from the speciﬁcs of relation-
ships (other than the distinction between adults and children) in order to capture those elements
that are common to all “roommate choices”: living with parents, spouses, grandparents, uncles,
adult children, servants, and so on.
27Thecalibrationexerciseimplies thatchangingdemographicsandconsumption patternsaccount
for one-half of the drop in the number of adults per household, and one-third of the drop in the
number of children per household. Thus, some of the changing structure of families, changing
attitudes towards fertility, and changing consumption habits can be viewed as efﬁcient responses
to changing incomes. While there is some popular concern about the social costs of smaller house-
holds, we quantify the beneﬁts: the value of time freed up from ﬁnding roommates and maintaining
good relationships is equivalent to 2.5 percent of GDP. In our model these changes are efﬁcient,
and there is no need for governments to subsidize larger families.
Our mechanism explains only part of the observed change, which leaves room for other chan-
nels. Changes in institutions and social norms were probably signiﬁcant factors. For example,
relaxed divorce laws may have facilitated the decline in the number of spouses per household.
Changes in female labor supply could be playing an important role. Likewise, the introduction
of social security may have affected the living arrangements of the elderly, particularly elderly
widows.
This paper also opens up several questions. For one, our model suggests that equivalence
scales are endogenous, and hence are different across different household types, but also might
be changing over time. Given this, what is an appropriate measure of equivalence scales, say, for
constructing poverty scales? We leave this inquiry for future research.
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32Appendix
A1 Data
The main sources of data for our analysis are the U.S. Census and the Consumer Expenditure
Survey.
A1.1 Census
First, we need to deﬁne a household. The Census deﬁnition of a household has always been related
to a group of persons who share a dwelling and share some resources. The measure of resources
used has changed somewhat over time: early Censuses emphasized shared income, but later ones
used shared kitchens, shared dining tables, shared cooking equipment, or meals taken together to
deﬁne a household. Although we suspect that the changes in the deﬁnition have little impact on
our measures, there is no way to evaluate that assertion formally.
The U.S. Census classiﬁes all housing units as households, group quarters, or vacant units.
According to the Census documentation “Group quarters are largely institutions and other group
living arrangements, such as rooming houses and military barracks.” We are interested in house-
holds, and not group quarters like college dorms, jails, hospitals, or mental institutions, where
living arrangements are largely involuntary. Unfortunately, the exact deﬁnition of group quarter
has varied also across Censuses. In the 1940 to 1970 Censuses, households with ﬁve or more per-
sons unrelated to the head are classiﬁed as a group quarters. For the 1850 to 1930 and 1980 to
1990 the condition is ten or more persons unrelated to the head.25 See Ruggles & Brower (2003)
for more details.26 The only way to construct a consistent measure of household is to consider as
group quarters all housing units with ﬁve or more unrelated members. In other words, households
can have at most four persons unrelated to the head. We call this the consistent deﬁnition of house-
hold. The main concern with this deﬁnition is that it may improperly classify large households as
group quarters. To mitigate this problem we have the “mixed” deﬁnition, where for censuses 1850-
1930 and 1980-2000 the only households that are classiﬁed as group quarters are those with ten or
more unrelated persons, and for 1940-1970 those with ﬁve or more unrelated persons. Figure A1
shows that the consistent and the mixed measures differ very little. The consistent deﬁnition gives
25In later years this constraint is not binding. For example in 2000 no households are classiﬁed as group quarters
based on the number of unrelated members.
26These authors also describe some problems with the classiﬁcation of household members according to their
relationship to the head.
33slightly lower numbers, which is not surprising since it classiﬁes some large households as group
quarters. All numbers used in the paper are based on the mixed deﬁnition.
Two other potential problems are as follows. First, some individuals that were sampled but
could not be associated to a group quarter or household are classiﬁed as fragments. We exclude
these. Second, not all members from large households were interviewed in the early Censuses.
Before 1930, information on at most 30 members of the household was collected. This is not a
concern given that less than 0.1 percent of the households have more than 30 members.


























































Note: Computed using U.S. Census data. “Mixed” indicates that for the 1850-1930 and 1980-1990
households with more than ten members unrelated to the head are classiﬁed as group quarters, as
well as those with more than ﬁve unrelated members for 1940-1970. “Consistent” indicates that
all households with more than ﬁve unrelated members are classiﬁed as group quarters (excluded
from the household count).
Table A1 gives the exact ﬁgures used in the paper.
A1.2 CEX
Our measures of consumption on private goods and household public goods are based on data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) from 1995 to 2000. The CEX collects detailed
data on the expenditure of American households as well as information on income and household
characteristics. The data is collected by the U.S. Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. The CEX consists of two surveys, the Diary and the Interview. The Diary is designed to
obtain expenditure data on small and frequently purchased items. The Interview is a rotating panel
that follows households for 5 quarters. It records information on about 95% of all expenditures
(excluding expenditures for housekeeping supplies, personal care products, and non-prescription
drugs). In this paper we use the Interview survey, which also gathers information on income and
34Table A1: Different Measures of Household Size
Census Household Family Adults Children Obs
Year Members Size
1850 6.16 5.18 3.47 2.68 99,016
1860 5.84 4.95 3.37 2.47 142,715
1870 5.66 4.79 3.30 2.36 201,914
1880 5.54 4.67 3.34 2.21 273,521
1900 5.23 4.51 3.34 1.90 436,140
1910 5.06 4.34 3.33 1.73 548,914
1920 4.79 4.27 3.17 1.62 634,416
1930 4.56 4.11 3.09 1.47 761,371
1940 4.18 3.91 2.98 1.20 886,961
1950 3.77 3.58 2.65 1.12 1,141,994
1960 3.66 3.57 2.37 1.30 1,106,337
1970 3.50 3.42 2.30 1.19 2,548,180
1980 3.18 3.06 2.30 0.88 1,569,017
1990 3.09 2.90 2.31 0.78 1,796,436
2000 3.07 2.83 2.28 0.79 2,011,639
Note: Computed using U.S. Census data. The unit of observation is an adult. Household members
refers to all persons in the household. Family size includes only those related by blood, marriage
or adoption. Adults are individuals 18 years of age or older.
socio-demographic variables such as number of household members. The ﬁrst interview is consid-
ered a baseline and its main purpose is to obtain an inventory of household appliances. Data on
consumption is collected on the second to ﬁfth interviews and refer to expenditures made in the
previous three months. Figures on income are collected only on the second and ﬁfth interviews.
The main information that we obtain from CEX is the consumption of public and private goods
in the household. The survey identiﬁes each consumption item by a Universal Classiﬁcation Code
(UCC), and there are around 550 UCCs. We classify all consumption items into public and private
at the UCC level.
The main characteristic of the goods that we take into account when classifying them is their
intrinsic technology: whether a good can be used by several individuals at the same time. With
this in mind, we construct some rules to give discipline to the classiﬁcation of goods. The ﬁrst rule
is that if the good cannot be shared under any circumstances, then we classify it as private. This
is the case with meals and beverages consumed in restaurants, public transportation (e.g. plane or
bus tickets), health plans and medical expenditures, some recreational expenses (like club fees or
ticketsforevents), andeducation. Secondly, weclassifyallgoodsthatcanbesharedbytakingturns
as public unless they typically are not shared for one of the following ﬁve reasons: coincidence
of usage, depreciation, hygiene, taste, or ﬁt. Using these rules leads us to classify the following
as private goods: linens (coincidence of usage), towels (coincidence of usage), jewelry (taste),
35personal care appliances (hygiene), magazines (taste), and school supplies (ﬁt), and clothing (ﬁt)
as private.
On the other hand, we classify the following as public goods. First, all housing and housing
related expenditures including utilities are classiﬁed as public goods. A home typically is shared
by all household members, and there is no particular feature of a house that typically is not shared
for any of our ﬁve reasons. In other words, all household members beneﬁt from a home. As part
of household expenditures we include rent for households that rent and an imputed rent for home
owners. The annual imputed rent was estimated as 1/16 of the reported market value of the home,
within the range of rental-price ratios reported in Morris A. Davis, Andreas Lehnert & Robert F.
Martin (2008).
Using the same logic, we classify most durable goods also as public. The non-rivalry charac-
teristic is not as evident as in the housing case given that, for example, only one person can sit in
a chair at a time. However, we consider that all household members can beneﬁt from durables at
home given that they suffer a very small depreciation when one person uses it. In this category we
include most furniture, dishwashers, dinnerware, appliances, TVs and the like, computers, pets,
and recreational equipment. We use the same logic for cars and related expenditures. Another
category we classify as public is food prepared at home. This classiﬁcation is based on Deaton &
Paxson (1998) who argue that there are economies of scale in the preparation of food consumed at
home.
Summing up, goods that are identiﬁed as public are: food at home, home related expenditures,
utilities, laundry, kitchen utensils, most furniture, cars, car related expenditures, TV, DVD, other
household appliances, newspapers and books, and contributions. Private goods include food away
from home, linens, bedroom furniture, travel items, clothing, transport (bus or plane), school tu-
ition, health expenses, club or recreational lessons, and personal care. We excluded categories
that are investment rather than consumption goods (such as home repairs). Other excluded items
are ﬁnance charges and care for household members (babysitting and adult care centers). The
classiﬁcation at the UCC level is available from the authors upon request.
For all calculations, the sample is restricted to households that responded about their expen-
ditures in the four interviews, so that there is information on their annual consumption. This
restriction reduces our sample size to 40% of the households. Additionally, we retain only those
households where there were no changes in the number of household members. This is the case
for 85% of the households. Finally, given that we interpret income as a measure of productivity,
we also drop households for which there is a missing or negative value for income. Because we are
interested in the behavior of the variables for the average adult, the unit of observation is an adult
(18 years of age or older). The ﬁnal number of observations is 29,277 adults in 15,942 households.
All dollar quantities are converted to real terms using CPI.
36We construct a measure of annual consumption (public and private) by adding information
from the four interviews. Income is reported on an annual basis and we use the ﬁgure reported
in the ﬁfth interview. The income variable that we assign to each adult is total household income
divided by the number of adults in the household.
For the calibration of the model (and other statistics presented in Section 3), we construct
the ratio of public to private consumption expenditures. To do so we obtain the mean value of
expenditures in public and private goods for adults of a particular age group. We take the ratio of
these aggregates as our moment in the model and the data. Additionally, we compute the income
elasticities of this ratio for our age groups. For each age group we calculate the income elasticity
of the public-private consumption ratio based on the ﬁve quintile observations. Table A2 shows
these measures for two of the age groups. It shows clearly how across quintiles the ratio of public
to private goods falls and how, at the same time, both measures of household size (adults and
children) decrease. Note that the household size numbers differ slightly from Table 1 since these
numbers are based on the CEX rather than the Census.
Table A2: Average Household Size by Income Quintiles, 1995-2000









1 (0.20) 3.60 3.60 2.65 0.95 4.21 3.79 2.40 1.40
2 (0.55) 3.80 3.43 2.56 0.87 3.65 3.61 2.17 1.44
3 (0.83) 3.49 3.23 2.33 0.91 3.57 3.16 2.07 1.10
4 (1.20) 3.21 2.90 2.30 0.60 3.45 2.91 1.97 0.94
5 (2.23) 2.99 2.66 2.19 0.47 2.92 2.75 1.88 0.88
Note: Authors’ calculations based on CEX data (1995-2000). The unit of observation is an adult. Income is computed as total
income in the household divided by the total number of adults. We report relative incomes as a multiple of average income.
Public/Private refers to expenditures on public goods as a proportion of expenditures on private goods. HH members stands for
the total number members of the household.
We have four robustness checks on the classiﬁcation of goods into public and private. Figure
A2presentsthemeanratioH/Vbyincomequintile, averagedacrossagegroupsforthebaselineand
each of the additional exercises. First, we exclude from the analysis expenditures on goods that are
likely to have a controversial classiﬁcation as either public or private goods. These items include
cars, babysitting and adult care, videos, some games and toys, CDs, ﬁshing and photo equipment,
magazines, newspapers, and books. All were classiﬁed as public except photo equipment which
was private. Excluding controversial items decreases H/V for all quintiles, and does not alter the
main conclusion that richer people consume a smaller proportion of public goods. The income
elasticity of H/V at the baseline for this age group is -0.12, and excluding controversial items
37does not change it. In a second robustness check we classify babysitting and adult care as private
instead of excluding them (“Care as Private”). The difference from the baseline is very small
(the elasticity is -0.13). The third exercise consists of classifying all goods that can be shared in
some way, like taking turns, as public (“Max Public”). The main items that change classiﬁcation
are some furniture and clothing. In this case, as is shown in Figure A2, H/V increases, but the
elasticity only changes to -0.09. Finally, the largest drop in the ratio results from reclassifying cars
as private instead of as public. This reduces the income elasticity to -0.05.











1 2 3 4 5
Income Quintile
 Benchmark Exclude Controversial
Cars as Private Care as Private
Max Public
Note: Computed using data from CEX, 1995-2000. Results shown are average results for a quintile, across ages. The
case“Excludecontroversial”doesnotconsiderallgoodswhoseclassiﬁcationintopublicorprivatewascontroversial.
“Cars as Private” reclassiﬁes cars from public into private goods. “Care as Private” considers items like babysitting
or adult care in the private category instead of excluding them. “Max Public” classiﬁes as public all goods that can
be shared in some way.
38A2 Computational Methods and Calibration Details
Let e denote elasticity. For example, eD
S;z(a) is the income elasticity of adult household size S for
people of age a in the data, while eM
S;z(a) is the same elasticity in the model. Using this notation,























































































Note that the empirical average of 4% of time spent with children has been substituted in already.
39Table A3: Moments in Model and Data
Moment Data Value Model Value Moment Data Value Model Value
Average S, 18-22 3.051 3.041 Average K, 18-22 0.857 0.856
Average S, 23-27 2.519 2.508 Average K, 23-27 0.839 0.836
Average S, 28-32 2.209 2.215 Average K, 28-32 1.180 1.186
Average S, 33-37 2.137 2.145 Average K, 33-37 1.518 1.515
Average S, 38-42 2.192 2.193 Average K, 38-42 1.420 1.419
Average S, 43-47 2.300 2.292 Average K, 43-47 1.010 1.011
Average S, 48-52 2.328 2.304 Average K, 48-52 0.554 0.546
Average S, 53-57 2.255 2.243 Average K, 53-57 0.290 0.299
Average S, 58-62 2.183 2.150 Average K, 58-62 0.197 0.200
Average S, 63-67 2.101 2.059 Average K, 63-67 0.162 0.165
Average S, 68-72 2.021 2.039 Average K, 68-72 0.125 0.126
Average S, 73+ 1.858 1.906 Average K, 73+ 0.084 0.083
S-Elasticity, 18-22 0.009 -0.073 K-Elasticity, 18-22 -0.106 -0.145
S-Elasticity, 23-27 -0.096 -0.073 K-Elasticity, 23-27 -0.334 -0.145
S-Elasticity, 28-32 -0.116 -0.074 K-Elasticity, 28-32 -0.247 -0.148
S-Elasticity, 33-37 -0.084 -0.074 K-Elasticity, 33-37 -0.097 -0.150
S-Elasticity, 38-42 -0.118 -0.074 K-Elasticity, 38-42 0.021 -0.149
S-Elasticity, 43-47 -0.125 -0.073 K-Elasticity, 43-47 0.083 -0.145
S-Elasticity, 48-52 -0.110 -0.072 K-Elasticity, 48-52 -0.063 -0.138
S-Elasticity, 53-57 -0.074 -0.071 K-Elasticity, 53-57 -0.255 -0.131
S-Elasticity, 58-62 -0.063 -0.070 K-Elasticity, 58-62 -0.299 -0.126
S-Elasticity, 63-67 -0.026 -0.070 K-Elasticity, 63-67 -0.319 -0.123
S-Elasticity, 68-72 -0.035 -0.069 K-Elasticity, 68-72 -0.141 -0.119
S-Elasticity, 73+ -0.036 -0.070 K-Elasticity, 73+ 0.056 -0.117
H/V-Elasticity, 18-22 -0.143 -0.091 Time Spent with Kids 0.040 0.039
H/V-Elasticity, 23-27 -0.095 -0.091
H/V-Elasticity, 28-32 -0.155 -0.092
H/V-Elasticity, 33-37 -0.093 -0.093
H/V-Elasticity, 38-42 -0.072 -0.092
H/V-Elasticity, 43-47 -0.121 -0.092
H/V-Elasticity, 48-52 -0.076 -0.090
H/V-Elasticity, 53-57 -0.112 -0.090
H/V-Elasticity, 58-62 -0.096 -0.089
H/V-Elasticity, 63-67 -0.069 -0.088
H/V-Elasticity, 68-72 -0.044 -0.088
H/V-Elasticity, 73+ -0.016 -0.089
Note: Average S and K by age group are computed using the 2000 U.S. Census. Details are presented in Appendix A1.1. Income
elasticities for S, K, and H=(V +Vk) by age group, were computed using 1995-2000 CEX data, as described in Appendix A1.2. Time
spent with kids is estimated based on BLS information.
40